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In this presentation, I review physical principles behind a recently proposed [1] Universal Theory
of Relativity and speculate on the mathematical requirements implied by these physical principles.
Some unresolved issues will also be discussed.
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Newtonian explanations of physical phenomena
rest on four, mutually logically independent, con-
ceptions, namely, those of inertia, force, source of
the force and a law of motion. Due to the mutual
logical independencies of these conceptions, these
are the assumptions or postulates of the newtonian
theoretical framework. The same logical indepen-
dency of basic concepts is also behind “the equal-
ity of inertia and gravitational mass of a physical
body” being an assumption of Newton’s theory.
Thus, newtonian theories cannot offer explanations
for the inertia, the source characteristics of physi-
cal matter, the law of force and the law of motion.
Within these limitations, newtonian theories still
explain a large body of observations.
To explain the known experimental data, we
then need to assume four fundamental forces, viz,
those of gravity, electromagnetism, strong nuclear
and weak nuclear interactions.
Theoretical physicists, in general, aim to “unify”
these four basic forces. That is to say, the grand
aim of theoretical physicists is to ‘show’ that these
fundamental forces arise from a single, mathemat-
ical or physical, entity. This “unification of the
four (fundamental) forces” is then required [1] to
also provide us an “explanation” that removes the
mutual logical independencies of the involved fun-
damental physical concepts. Evidently, this aim
requires departures from the newtonian conceptual
as well as mathematical framework.
Although, for some while, newtonian explana-
tions were considered to be encompassing the en-
tirety of observable phenomena, the experimental
data forced [2] departures away from the newto-
nian conceptual framework. This happened, as is
well known, towards the end of the 19th century.
Subsequent theoretical works progressed along the
following two separate directions.
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Firstly, Special Relativity expanded the Galilean
group to the Lorentz group of transformations (of
the same coordinates used by Newton to express
his Laws of Motion). This “group enlargement”
provided explanations for certain physical phenom-
ena, in particular, those from electromagnetism.
These explanations were considered “natural” be-
cause Maxwell’s equations, describing this radia-
tion reasonably successfully, are form-invariant un-
der the Lorentz group.
The same group enlargement also implies “mod-
ifications” to the Newtonian laws of motion and
leads to “theoretical relations” such as the inertia-
energy equivalence. These led to experimental pre-
dictions and to explanations of further physical
phenomena lending credence to those theoretical
relations. Einstein, specifically, attached [2] impor-
tance to the special relativistic result of the varia-
tion of inertia with velocity. That only the group
enlargement leads to this result left an indelible
mark on Einstein’s subsequent works which led
him to the Principle of General Relativity which
we shall consider at a later stage.
Black body radiation, photoelectric effect, spec-
troscopy forced the second theoretical direction.
Such physical phenomena led to mathematical
techniques away from the standard newtonian and
special relativistic ones. These, quantum theoretic,
techniques built on the newtonian notions using
Hilbert spaces, and led to specific experimental
predictions. For example, Quantum Theory pre-
dicted the phenomenon of tunnelling across a bar-
rier, and it was observed. Classical methods had
no explanations for this as well as many other ob-
served phenomena.
However, methods of neither special relativity
[13] nor can quantum theory [14] claim to remove
the mutual logical independencies of fundamental
newtonian notions. Rather, these methods, implic-
itly or explicitly, replace these notions by other
equivalent concepts which too are mutually logi-
cally independent. Thence, these methods are in-
adequate to achieve the aim of the unification of
the four fundamental forces.
2Einstein then took the bold step of formulating
judiciously constructed Gedanken or thought ex-
periments and arrived at his Principle of General
Relativity that the Laws of Physics should be ap-
plicable with respect to all the systems of reference,
in relative acceleration or not, without extraneous
or unnatural entities (like pseudo-forces) serendip-
itously entering into them.
Einstein’s experience with the special relativistic
group enlargement led him to realize that “group
enlargement”, further than that of the Lorentz
group of Special Relativity, is demanded by this
Principle of General Relativity. We then note that
Laws of Physics are some mathematical statements
about mathematical structures representing phys-
ical or “observable” bodies.
Clearly, there are two issues involved here: first
that of deciding which mathematical structures are
to represent physical bodies and, second, that of
mathematical statements (equations) about these
structures corresponding to physical or observable
changes imagined as the transformations of these
mathematical structures.
Einstein, in recognition of the above, wrote [2]:
♠ Of which mathematical type are the variables
(functions of the coordinates) which permit the
expression of the physical properties of the space
(“structure”)? Only after that: Which equations
are satisfied by those variables? ♠
It is crucial to recognize here that the systems
of reference in physics are ‘constructed’ out of the
very physical matter or bodies which are the sub-
ject of physical laws. That is to say, a physical
body gets used as a reference when physical mea-
surements are performed. Then, the very phys-
ical phenomena that are the subject of study in
Physics affect the physical construction of the ref-
erence systems. Hence, the validity of Einstein’s
principle of general relativity is incorporating, im-
plicitly or explicitly, the physical changes that can
occur to reference systems when various physical
phenomena take place.
Consequently, only that mathematical frame-
work which allows the physical systems of refer-
ence to be ‘affected’ by physical phenomena can be
consistent with the general principle of relativity.
This situation essentially provides us a guiding
principle for ‘selecting’ mathematical structures
to represent physical bodies.
To illustrate the use of this guiding principle,
let us consider the geometry of the surface of a
sphere. Mathematical coordination of the points
of the spherical surface is effected by choosing the
coordinate axes as the equator and a great cir-
cle passing through the north and the south poles.
Further mathematical apparatus is then developed
in the usual way by following the methodology of
the standard differential geometry.
Physically, however, we have to consider the
non-vanishing ‘thickness’ of the coordinate lines.
Then, the physical picture has a strip of some
thickness as the equatorial axis and another strip
as the axis of the ‘great circle’. The ‘ physical’
coordination of the spherical surface then refers to
these ‘thick’ coordinate axes.
Having chosen the ‘physical coordination’ of the
spherical surface as above, we consider a small ‘re-
gion’ of this surface, adjacent to the coordinate
strip, as a ‘physical’ object. Consider next that
this physical object moves. The motion of physi-
cal object is then required to ‘affect’ and deform
the chosen adjacent physical coordinate strip(s). A
general mathematical description of this situation
is what is then required by the physical situation
under consideration.
In this situation, the principle of general relativ-
ity then ‘demands’ that the laws of motion of this
‘physical object’ be stated, and that these be the
‘same’ mathematical statements, in relation to ‘all’
the permissible such physical coordinate systems of
the spherical surface.
Evidently, the mathematical formalism of the
standard differential geometry does not provide us
this description since, within its formalism, the co-
ordinate axes of the geometry of surface, once cho-
sen, do not ‘deform’ when we ‘move’ a region of
surface. Hence, the standard differential geometry
cannot faithfully implement Einstein’s principle of
general relativity [15].
Clearly, changes that occur to the “physical con-
struction” of reference systems [2] must also be the
part of any such description. Then, the equality of
the description of physical phenomena must also
hold incorporating any possible physical changes
to the constructions of reference systems. This sit-
uation necessitates appropriate “changes” also at
the conceptual levels.
That is to say, the validity of the principle of
general relativity not only demands a mathemati-
cal framework that incorporates the physical con-
struction of reference systems but also demands
that we “redefine” various physical notions. I will
refer to this general theoretical framework [1] as
the Universal Theory of Relativity.
In [1], I had discussed a mathematical frame-
work of the theories of measures and dynamical
systems for this universal relativity. It could how-
ever be considered to be not sufficiently general
and, hence, not entirely satisfactory. In [3], I had
therefore proposed that the mathematical frame-
work of Category Theory [4, 5] is an appropriate
basis for the universal relativity and had discussed
certain related mathematical issues.
3For the sake of wider attention, I will recall here
part of that discussion [3] about relevant mathe-
matical notions [6, 7] and how these notions could
incorporate the ideas of universal relativity. This
discussion then essentially focuses on the afore-
mentioned guiding principle. Needless to say here,
much more work is still needed.
For the sake of readability, I first recall some
relevant definitions and results [6, 7].
A category, C, consists of two collections - one
called the collection Co of objects (denoted by cap-
ital letters A, B, C, ...) and the other called the
collection CA of arrows (denoted by small letters
a, b, c, ...) and four operations. First of these op-
erations associates with each arrow f an object of
C called its source or domain (denoted by do(f)).
Second operation associates with f an object of C
called its target or co-domain (denoted by d1(f)).
We write f : C → D or C f→D to indicate that
f is an arrow with source C and target D. Third
operation associates with every object C ∈ Co an
arrow, denoted by idC and called the identity ar-
row of C, with source and target as C. The fourth
operation associates with any pair of arrows (f, g)
an arrow f ◦ g, called the composition of f and g,
such that do(f) = d1(g).
The above data are subject to the following four,
naturally arising, conditions:
do(1C) = C = d1(1C)
do(f ◦ g) = do(g), d1(f ◦ g) = d1(f)
1D ◦ f = f, f ◦ idC = f
(f ◦ g) ◦ h = f ◦ (g ◦ h)
For any two objects C and D of C, the collection
of all arrows from C to D is called the hom-set
and is denoted by HomC(C,D). We will assume
a fixed Universe U of sets and call members of U
small sets. When the hom-set is a small set for any
pair of objects of C, the category is called locally
small. We will always work with either small or
locally small categories.
From C, we form another category called the
dual or the opposite category, denoted by Cop, with
the same objects as in Co but with directions of all
arrows and the order of all compositions of arrows
in CA being reversed.
An arrow C f→D is called a monic if for any
E ∈ Co and any g, h : E ⇒ C in C1, f ◦ g = f ◦ h
implies g = h, and we write f : C ֌ D.
Two monic arrows f : A ֌ D and g : B ֌ D
are called equivalent if there exists an isomorphism
h : A∼→B such that g ◦ h = f .
A sub-object of D ∈ Co is an equivalence class of
monic arrows into D. The collection SubC(D) of
sub-objects of D ∈ Co then comes equipped with a
natural partial order: [f ] ≤ [g] if and only if there
is h : A → B with f = g ◦ h, where the square
brackets denote the equivalence class of the monic
under consideration. The concept of a sub-object
corresponds to that of a subset of a given set or to
that of a subspace of a given space.
An equalizer of (parallel) arrows f, g : A ⇒ B
is an arrow e : E → A with f ◦ e = g ◦ e and
such that given any other arrow u : X → A with
f ◦u = g◦u, there exists a unique arrow v : X → E
with e ◦ v = u. The notion of an equalizer in Cop
corresponds to a co-equalizer in C.
An object 0 or 0C in C is called as the initial
object if, for every other object D of C there exists
one and only one arrow from 0 to D. An object
1 or 1C in C is called as the terminal object if, for
every other object D of C there exists one and only
one arrow from D to 1.
An object X ∈ Co when equipped with arrows
pi1 : X → A and pi2 : X → B is called the product
of A and B if and only if for any other Y ∈ Co
and any two arrows f : Y → A and g : Y → B,
there exists a unique arrow h : Y → X such that
pi1 ◦ h = f and pi2 ◦ h = g.
A product in the dual category Cop corresponds
to what is called the co-product in C.
Consider objects A,B,C ∈ Co with f : B → A
and g : C → A. Next, consider an object P ∈ Co
with arrows p : P → B and q : P → C such that
f ◦p = g◦q. Such a collection of objects and arrows
is called a commutative square. A commutative
square is a pullback or fibred-product of B,C over
A, written B ×A C, iff, given any X ∈ Co and
arrows β : X → B and γ : X → C with f ◦ β =
g ◦ γ, there is a unique arrow δ : X → P such that
p ◦ δ = β and q ◦ δ = γ. When pullback exists,
we call p as the pullback of g along f or q as the
pullback of f along g.
A pullback in Cop corresponds to the notion of
a pushout in C.
A functor, F , from category C to category D,
is an operation which assigns to each C ∈ Co an
object F (C) ∈ Do, and to each f ∈ CA an arrow
F (f) ∈ DA such that
F (do(f)) = do(F (f))
F (d1(f)) = d1(F (f))
F (1C) = 1F (C)
F (f ◦ g) = F (f) ◦ F (g)
whenever f ◦ g is defined.
For categories C and D, a functor F : Cop → D is
called as contra-variant from C to D. A functor F :
C → D is called full (faithful) if for any C,C′ ∈ Co,
the operation HomC(C
′, C) → HomD(FC
′, FC),
f 7→ F (f), is surjective (injective).
4The operation C′ 7→ HomC(C
′, C) for fixed
C yields a contra-variant functor, called Hom-
functor, from C to Sets, where Sets is the cate-
gory of sets. Also, C 7→ HomC(C
′, C) for fixed C′
provides a covariant Hom-functor. Functors that
are isomorphic to the Hom-functor are said to be
representable functors.
Given functors F,G : C ⇒ D, a natural trans-
formation α : F → G is an assignment of each
object C ∈ Co to an arrow αC : FC → GC in
D1, called component of α at C, such that, for any
f : C′ → C in C1, G(f) ◦ αC′ = αC ◦ F (f).
If α : F → G and β : G → H are two natural
transformations between functors from category C
to categoryD, a composite natural transformation,
denoted β◦α, is then naturally definable by setting
(β ◦ α)C = βG(C) ◦ αC .
For fixed categories C,D, we can then construct
a functor category, denoted by DC , with its objects
as functors from C to D and its arrows as natural
transformations of these functors.
Given two functors in opposite directions, that
is, F : C → D and G : D → C, we say that F is left
adjoint to G, or, equivalently, G is right adjoint
to F , written F ⊣ G, when for any C ∈ Co and
D ∈ Do, there exists a bijective correspondence
θ : HomC(C,GD)
∼→HomD(FC,D) with the ar-
row f : C → GD uniquely determining the arrow
h : FC → D and conversely.
With the adjunction as above, the unique arrow
ηC : C → GFC with θ(ηC) = 1F (C) is called the
unit of adjunction at C. The dual notion is that
of the co-unit of adjunction which also is a unique
arrow εD : FGD → C.
When product A × B of any pair of objects
A,B ∈ Co exists, it provides the product functor
× : C2 → C, where 2 is the 2-object category, with
only identity arrows of those objects. The prod-
uct functor is right adjoint to the diagonal functor
△ : C → C2 sending C ∈ Co to C × C.
Let products exist in C. Fix an object A ∈ Co
and consider a functor A × − : C → C. If a
right adjoint to this functor exists, we denote it
by (−)A : C → C and say that the object A is an
exponentiable object of C.
A category C is said to be cartesian closed if
it has a terminal object, binary products and if
all objects of C are exponentiable. For any small
category C, the functor category Ĉ = SetsC
op
is a
cartesian closed category.
Consider the functor category CJ with a fixed
category C and a small category J. An object of CJ
is called a diagram of type J in C. Each object C ∈
Co determines a constant diagram △J(C) having
the same value C for all j ∈ J. This provides a
diagonal functor △J : C → C
J.
A natural transformation pi from △J(C) to an-
other diagram A of CJ therefore consists of arrows
fj : C → Aj , for each ‘index’ j ∈ J, all such that
fj : C → A(j), fk : C → A(k), A(u) : A(j)→ A(k)
with u : j → k form a commutative triangle for
every arrow u ∈ J1. We call pi a cone f : C → A
on the diagram A with vertex C.
A cone pi : L → A with vertex L is universal
when to every other cone f : C → A corresponds
a unique arrow g : C → L in C with pij ◦ g = fj for
every j ∈ Jo. We call this universal cone pi : L→ A
as the limit of the diagram A.
If every diagram in the functor category CJ has
a limit in this sense then, the diagonal functor △J
has a right adjoint - lim←J : C
J → C - and the
co-unit of this adjunction is the universal cone,
which is a natural transformation - pi : △J(L) =
△J(lim←JA)→ A.
The notion dual to limit is that of the co-limit.
If the co-limit of any diagram of type J in C exists
then, it provides a functor lim→J : C
J → C which
is left-adjoint to △J : C
J → C.
If C, D are categories and CD is the functor cat-
egory, with diagrams of type J in C existing in C (J
being a small category), then the same holds also
for CD, and the evaluation functor (−)D : C
D → C,
for any D ∈ Do, preserves such limits.
Consequently, for each D ∈ D, (lim←JA)(D) ∼=
lim←JAD where the limit on the left is in C
D and
that on the right is in C. Similarly, for the co-
limits, (lim→JA)(D) ∼= lim→JAD.
Now, a sub-object classifier is a monic arrow
true : 1C ֌ Ω, where Ω ∈ Co, such that for every
monic g : S ֌ X in C1, with S,X ∈ Co, there ex-
ists a unique arrow φ : X → Ω, making a pullback
diagram of f : S → 1C , g, φ and true. This evi-
dently requires the category C to have finite limits,
ie, to admit a terminal object 1C. This general-
izes the set-theoretic notion of the characteristic
function of the subset of a set.
Then, in a category C with finite limits, every
sub-object is uniquely a pullback of the “universal”
monic true : 1C ֌ Ω. The sub-object functor is
then isomorphic to a Hom-functor, ie, SubC(X) ∼=
HomC(X,Ω). That is to say, a sub-object functor
is representable when the underlying category C
admits finite limits. A category is said to be well-
powered when SubC(X) is isomorphic to a small
set for all X ∈ Co.
A category E with (i) all finite limits and co-
limits, (ii) all objects in Eo being exponentiable,
and (iii) a sub-object classifier true : 1E → Ω, is
called an elementary topos or, simply, a topos. A
topos is, then, a complete cartesian closed category
equipped with a sub-object classifier. Examples of
toposes include Sets, the functor category SetsC
op
for a small category C, etc.
5At this point, we note that the Intuitionistic
Propositional Calculus [16], as formalized by Heyt-
ing, has a typical model in the form of the set of all
open subsets of a topological space. In this model,
the operations ∧ and ∨ of the propositional calcu-
lus correspond to intersection and union, but the
operations ⇒ and ¬ have to be suitably reinter-
preted in order to yield open sets. Then, U ⇒ V
is the largest open setW withW ∧U ⊂ V , and ¬U
is the interior of the complement of U - the largest
open set disjoint from U .
Model independent characterization of this intu-
itionistic propositional calculus is provided by the
notion of a distributive lattice as follows.
Any partially ordered set (poset) (P,≤) gives rise
to a category for which the elements of P are ob-
jects and there exists one and only one arrow from
p to q iff p ≤ q. Identity arrows are forced by re-
flexivity and the composition of arrows is forced
by the transitivity of the partial order.
A lattice is a poset having, as a category, all
binary products and all binary co-products.
A poset P is complete iff every subset of P has
a lowest upper bound (lub or sup or join) and a
greatest lower bound (glb or inf or meet). A poset
P is then complete iff, as a category, P has all
limits and all co-limits.
A complete lattice L with elements 0 and 1 with
0 ≤ x ≤ 1 for all x ∈ L is a complete poset.
A lattice L with 0 and 1 is then equationally ex-
pressible as a set with two ‘distinguished’ elements
0, 1 and two, associative & commutative, binary
operations ∧ (meet) and ∨ (join) satisfying:
x ∧ x = x, x ∨ x = x
1 ∧ x = x, 0 ∨ x = x
x ∧ (y ∨ x) = x, (x ∧ y) ∨ x = x
We may then define a ‘lattice object’ L in a cat-
egory C with finite products as the partial order of
the lattice is recoverable from the above equations
on the operations ∧ : L × L → L, ∨ : L × L → L
and 0, 1 : 1C → L.
A lattice L is said to be distributive iff, for all
x, y, z ∈ L,
x ∧ (y ∨ z) = (x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z)
A complement of x ∈ L with 0 and 1 is then an
element a ∈ L such that x ∧ a = 0 and x ∨ a = 1.
In a distributive lattice, a complement, if it exists,
is necessarily unique.
A Boolean algebra B is a distributive lattice
with 0 and 1 in which every element x has a com-
plement. In B, ¬x is then interpreted as a com-
plement. M H Stone’s theorem asserts that every
boolean algebra is isomorphic to an algebra of some
of the subsets of some set.
A Heyting algebra H or the Brouwerian Lat-
tice is a poset with all finite products, all finite
co-products and is cartesian closed as a category.
Underlying lattice of any Heyting algebra can be
shown to be distributive.
An exponential yx, x, y ∈ H , is usually written
as x ⇒ y and is characterized by its adjunction:
z ≤ (x⇒ y) if and only if z ∧ x ≤ y.
In a Heyting algebra, we define the negation of
x as ¬x = (x⇒ 0). Then, ¬x, is not necessarily a
complement of x, since x∧¬x = 0 but, not always,
x ∨ ¬x = 1. However, if a complement of x ∈ H
exists, then it must equal ¬x. Also, ¬¬x need not
equal x in any Heyting algebra.
Moreover, the following also hold in any Heyting
algebra:
x ≤ ¬¬x,
x ≤ y implies ¬y ≤ ¬x
¬x = ¬¬¬x
¬¬(x ∧ y) = ¬¬x ∧ ¬¬y
The ‘negation’ is then a functor ¬ : H → Hop
and also ¬ : Hop → H which is adjoint to itself. A
Heyting algebra is then a Boolean algebra iff this
adjunction is an isomorphism. That is, a Heyting
algebra is Boolean iff ¬¬x = x for all x ∈ H or, iff
x∨¬x = 1 for all x ∈ H . Then, quantifiers of pred-
icate calculus like (∀) and (∃) are also adjunctions
in a Heyting algebra setting.
In any lattice L with 0 and 1, a binary operation
⇒ satisfying, for all x, y, z ∈ L,
(x⇒ x) = 1
x ∧ (x⇒ y) = x ∧ y, y ∧ (x⇒ y) = y
x⇒ (y ∨ z) = (x⇒ y) ∨ (x⇒ z)
must be the ‘implication’ of a Heyting algebra
structure on the lattice L.
In a functor category Ĉ = SetsC
op
with a small
category C, for the object P of Ĉo, the partially or-
dered set Sub
Ĉ
(P ) of sub-objects of P is, in partic-
ular, a Heyting algebra (and sometimes, a special
case, Boolean algebra).
A Frame is then a complete lattice L in which
binary meet distributes over arbitrary joins, ie,
x ∧
∨
S =
∨
{x ∧ y|y ∈ S}
for all x ∈ L and S ⊆ L.
A Frame homomorphism is a map h : L → M
between Frames L and M preserving finite meets
(including the top 1) and arbitrary joins (including
the bottom 0).
Any a ∈ L gives rise to two new Frames called
as the open quotient, ↓ a = {x ∈ L|x ≤ a}, and the
closed quotient, ↑ a = {x ∈ L|x ≥ a}, determined
by a ∈ L with homomorphisms L→↓ a : x 7→ x∧a
and L→↑ a : x 7→ x ∨ a.
6A particular Frame, a complete distributive lat-
tice with 0 and 1, is then a Heyting algebra always.
Also, for any topological space X , the lattice of its
open sets, OX , forms a Frame, being partially or-
dered by set inclusion.
The correspondence X → OX is functorial with
the functor O : Top → Frm being a contravariant
functor, with Top as the category of topological
spaces and Frm being the category of Frames. Any
continuous map f : X → Y determines a Frame
homomorphism Of : OY → OX with Of(U) =
f− 1(U) for all U ∈ OY .
The Spectrum functor in the opposite direction
Σ : Frm → Top assigns to each Frame L its
spectrum ΣL that is the space of all homomor-
phisms ξ : L → 2, 2 being the 2-element lattice.
Each homomorphism ξ is called as a point of L,
and provides open sets Σa = {ξ ∈ ΣL|ξa = 1} for
any a ∈ L. It also assigns to each of the Frame
homomorphisms h : M → L a continuous map
Σh : ΣL → ΣM such that Σh(ξ) = ξh with
(Σh)− 1(Σa) = Σh(a) for any a ∈M .
The two functors O and Σ are adjoint on the
right with the unit of this adjunction being denoted
by ηL and the co-unit by εX .
Frames for which ηL is an isomorphism are
called spatial. OX is a spatial Frame.
Spaces for which εX is a homomorphism are
called the Sober Spaces. Category of Sober spaces
Sob is dually equivalent to the full subcategory of
SpFrm of spatial Frames.
Category opposite to Frm is called as the cat-
egory Loc of locales and it contains Sob as a full
subcategory. Category Loc is often used in the rel-
evant mathematical literature on pointless topol-
ogy which provides a wider basis than the usual
topological structure.
A Frame of reals, denoted by L(R), is a frame
generated by all ordered pairs (p, q), p, q ∈ Q, sub-
ject to the following relations:
(p, q) ∧ (r, s) = (p ∧ r, q ∧ s)
(p, q) ∨ (r, s) = (p, s) whenever p ≤ r < q ≤ s
(p, q) =
∨
{(r, s)|p < r < s < q}
1 =
∨
{(p, q)|p, q ∈ Q}
where 1 denotes the top of L(R) and Q denotes the
set of rational numbers.
The real numbers are then the Frame homomor-
phisms L(R)→ 2, that is to say, the points of the
frame L(R) or the spectrum Σ (L(R)).
A continuous real-valued function on an arbi-
trary Frame L is then defined as a Frame homo-
morphism L(R) → L. Continuous functions on L
are then L-valued real numbers.
In the setting of pointless topology, the algebra
R(L) of continuous real-valued functions on Frame
L is then definable using Frame homomorphisms
α, β, ... from L(R) → L, with operations of this
algebra being determined by the operations of Q
as a lattice-ordered ring.
Next, a sheaf F of sets on a topological space X
is a contravariant functor F : O(X)op → Sets such
that each open covering U =
⋃
i, i ∈ I, of an open
set U of X yields an equalizer diagram:
FU
e
99K
∏
i
FUi
p
⇒
q
∏
i,j
F
(
Ui
⋂
Uj
)
where for t ∈ FU , e(t) = {t|Ui |i ∈ I} and for
a family ti ∈ FUi, p(ti) = {ti|(Ui
⋂
Uj)}, q(ti) =
{ti|(Ui
⋂
Uj)}. Here O(X) denotes the category of
all open subsets of X , arrows of O(X) being pro-
vided by set inclusions. Then, an arrow F → G of
sheaves is a natural transformation of functors. By
its definition, the category, Sh(X), of sheaves over
a topological space X is then a full sub-category
of the functor category Ô(X) = SetsO(X)
op
. The
category Sh(X) of sheaves over the space X is, in
particular, a topos.
Thus, a sheaf is [7] a “continuous set-valued”
function. A sub-sheaf of a sheaf F over a space X
is a sub-functor of F which is itself a sheaf. Cat-
egorical co-limits of finite limits in Sh(X) provide
geometric constructions. These are point-wise and
provide sheaves. Category Sh(X) of sheaves over
X then contains an object - called the generic set
- from which every other object of Sh(X) can be
geometrically constructed [7].
Thus, whenX is a topological space, sub-sheaves
of the terminal object of Sh(X) provide the open
subsets of X . When X are Sober spaces, continu-
ous maps between them are functors between the
corresponding categories of sheaves preserving the
geometric constructions.
Assigning, in particular, to a ∈ L the set of all
continuous real-valued functions on ↓ a defines a
sheaf on Frame L. This sheaf is then a real num-
ber object in the topos of sheaves on L. [Note how-
ever that this construction does not extend to the
category Frm of Frames.]
In general, the object RX of Dedekind reals in
the topos Sh(X), where X is a topological space, is
isomorphic to the sheaf of continuous real-valued
functions on X defined on the open sets U of X by
RX(U) ∼= {f : U → R|f is continuous}.
Sh(X) then provides [7, 8] a generalization of
a topological space - the generalized space of sets
- because the generic set is, in general, not iso-
morphic to the initial object of Sh(X), and the
sub-objects of the terminal object of Sh(X) not
necessarily its elements. Consequently, the notion,
for example, of “continuity” acquires a new mean-
ing in terms of the generic set.
7Topos Theory was then developed [7, 9, 10, 11]
using a complete cartesian closed category with a
sub-object classifier - a Topos - as its fundamental
structure which is free of all set theoretic assump-
tions. This, Lawvere and Tierney, axiomatization
is elementary in the sense of the first order logic
with no reference to set theory.
Based on topos theoretic ideas, the differential
structure built by giving up the Law of Excluded
Middle in the Euclidean setup leads to Synthetic
Differential Geometry [8].
Using a topos equipped with the notion of
an infinitesimal time-interval, it is then possible
[9, 10, 11] to recast the newtonian framework into
the topos theoretic language. In [12], equations of
physics, such as a wave equation and a heat equa-
tion, are also discussed from this point of view.
Physically, the construction of a reference sys-
tem must use physical bodies. [Recall, from our
earlier example, the ‘thick’ coordinate lines of the
surface of sphere.] For its mathematical expres-
sion, we may consider a physical body as a collec-
tion of open subsets of some topological space X
[17]. A physical reference system may therefore be
mathematically representable as a Frame, a spa-
tial Frame. Our “guiding principle” then leads us,
thus far, to this identification.
Generalizing on the above, the category Frm of
Frames or, equivalently, the category Loc of locales
could then form the underlying mathematical ba-
sis for Universal Relativity. The category Sh(X)
would also be equally relevant. In this framework,
Frame homomorphisms could then represent the
occurrence of physical phenomena affecting the ref-
erence systems.
Issues regarding the physical characteristics of
material bodies will then involve suitable measures
over Frames. Corresponding mathematical ques-
tions have not been addressed as yet.
Furthermore, the category Frm is not a Topos.
(There exist many other categories which are not
toposes.) Consequently, it is unclear whether the
Topos Theory could form a mathematical basis for
the universal relativity as it did [9] for the newto-
nian theoretical framework.
It may also be noted here that the work in [12]
assumes, in a topos setting, a cartesian closed cat-
egory with a commutative ring object for formulat-
ing the ‘wave equation’ as an ordinary differential
equation with values in the vector space (meaning
R-module) of distributions.
But, the category Frm is not a topos. It is there-
fore equally unclear whether the description in [12]
is any sufficiently general one.
[However, a detailed investigation of this and
other issues involved herein will surely be impor-
tant to the understanding of various implications
of the universal theory of relativity.
In any case, the newtonian mathematical frame-
work is required to be a part of that for the univer-
sal theory of relativity. Consequently, the mathe-
matical framework of universal relativity will have
to ‘incorporate’ this topos theoretic treatment of
newtonian theories.]
Still, the notion of a category is general indeed
and, hence, could itself form the basis for universal
relativity. To apply categorical notions to physical
situations in universal relativity, we then need to
associate, in some manner, an appropriate mathe-
matical notion for ‘physical characteristics of ma-
terial bodies’ to objects, or, equivalently, to arrows
of the category.
An important unanswered mathematical issue is
then of defining an appropriate notion of measures
(or a generalization thereof) within the basic set-
ting of the category theory.
Notably, very general ideas from Physics and
Mathematics, both, appear to become quite identi-
cal here. Starting with the limited formalism in [1],
this “realization” is certainly a significant progress.
Much more work is clearly required before the the-
oretical framework of the universal theory of rela-
tivity can be mathematically represented in a sat-
isfactory manner.
I hope to have clarified here physical principles
behind the universal theory of relativity in suf-
ficient details and to also have conveyed to the
reader its mathematical requirements.
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